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What Human Planning Can Tell Us
About Animal Planning: An Empirical
Case
Gema Martin-Ordas*
Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom
The ability to think about and plan for the future is a critical cognitive skill for our daily life.
There is ongoing debate about whether other animals possess future thinking. Part of
the difficulty in resolving this debate is that there is not a definite methodology that allow
us to conclude that animals (and human children) are truly thinking about a future event.
Research with humans—both children and adults- will benefit the field of comparative
psychology by providing information about the range of humans’ responses when they
are faced with problems similar to those presented to other animals. Inspired by a
problem that chimpanzees experienced in the wild, children of 4 and 5 years of age
and young adults were presented with a situation in which they were expected to select
two tools in order to obtain a reward. More older children than 4 years old successfully
obtained the reward. Adults also succeeded at solving the problem. However, both
children and adults struggled to select the two correct tools before any tool-use action
was executed. While children’s performance is discussed in the context of temporal
components required to envisage future events, adults’ performance is interpreted in
the context of cognitive effort. These findings link developmental and adult cognition
with comparative psychology.
Keywords: planning, tool use, sequence, preschoolers, adults
INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that humans can think and plan for the future (e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis,
2007). In fact, we spend an important part of our time mind-wandering about the future (e.g.,
Smallwood et al., 2009; Baird et al., 2011). Developmental research has shown that the ability to
think about the future develops between ages 4 and 5 (e.g., Russell et al., 2010; Suddendorf et al.,
2011; Atance and Sommerville, 2014). The experimental approach to study future thinking in
children has mainly relied on the use of the Spoon test (Tulving, 2005). This test is based on the
following scenario: A young girl dreams that she is at a party where all the guests are being served
chocolate pudding. To eat the pudding, the young girl needs a spoon, but she does not have one.
That night, she falls asleep while holding a spoon. Bringing the spoon represents an instance of
future thinking because it implies envisioning a need that will occur in the future.
Suddendorf et al. (2011) adapted Tulving’s idea by presenting children with a problem (e.g.,
locked box with no key) in room A and a set of items (including a key) in room B. Their
study showed that 4 but not 3 year olds choose the correct item to take back to room A (for
similar results see: Atance and Meltzoff, 2005; Russell et al., 2010; Redshaw and Suddendorf,
2013; Scarf et al., 2013; Atance and Sommerville, 2014; Atance et al., 2015; Cuevas et al., 2015;
Dickerson et al., 2018). Overall, these studies typically show an age-related improvement in future
thinking between ages 3 to 5. The Spoon test has also been successfully implemented in studies
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with great apes. For example, Mulcahy and Call (2006) presented
orangutans and bonobos with an out-of-reach reward and with a
set of useful and useless tools, which they could take into a waiting
room. To obtain the reward, subjects had to return to the room
where the out-of-reach reward was placed, carrying the useful
tool, either 1 or 24 h after having seen the reward. Mulcahy and
Call showed that great apes did select and save the correct tool for
a future use (see Osvath and Osvath, 2008 for similar results).
However, an important concern with the just described
Spoon tests is that it is unclear whether thinking about a
future event is needed when making successful choices. In
these tasks, selecting the correct item may only indicate that
subjects know that, for example, the key is useful for unlocking
the box now without having to represent its use in a future
event (e.g., Martin-Ordas, 2018; Hoerl and McCormack, 2019).
To address this issue, it is required to demonstrate that
individuals have some understanding of what the future might
entail. Including a temporal component [i.e., before-and-after
relationships; henceforth “temporal reasoning” (McCormack and
Hoerl, 2011; Hoerl and McCormack, 2019)] will help assessing
when in development the ability to envision the future emerges.
Recently, Martin-Ordas (2018) addressed this issue by presenting
3-, 4- and 5-year-olds with a task in which, to secure a future
need (e.g., play with a marble run game), children first had
to obtain a key that allowed them next to access the marbles.
By the age of four children selected the key; however, it is
only by the age of 5 that children reasoned about the temporal
sequence of future events and selected the key. Thus, this study
highlighted the importance of assessing the temporal component
of future thinking.
Interestingly, chimpanzees at the Goualougo Triangle
(Republic of Congo) have been described to use two tools in
sequence—a puncturing stick first and fishing probes next-
when trying to access the termites from subterranean nests.
Chimpanzees usually arrive at the nests with the two tools and,
crucially, they have never been observed to only transport the
puncturing stick—alone it would not be effective (Sanz et al.,
2004). This study nicely illustrates how planning (e.g., Hayes-
Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1979; Miller et al., 1960) might entail a
temporal component since transporting both tools—as opposed
to only bringing one tool regardless of its function—indicates
envisioning the two steps of the termite-extracting problem
(Byrne et al., 2013).
Inspired by Sanz et al.’s (2004) study, a termite-extracting
problem was adapted to determine whether children 4 and
5 years of age and adults can plan for a future event that
involves selecting two tools. In the current studies, participants
were presented with a task that needed a “puncturing” tool
to first make a hole on the top a cylinder and a “hook”
tool to subsequently pull a reward through the hole (see
Weir et al., 2002; Beck et al., 2011; for a similar task). In
order to succeed, participants had to envision the two steps
of the problem and select the correct two tools. There was a
“Spatial-displacement group” (i.e., the task and four items—
the two necessary tools and two other functionless items- were
placed in two different rooms) and a “No-spatial-displacement
group” (i.e., items and task were placed in the same room).
For the Spatial-displacement group, successful performance
required selecting the tools while holding a memory of the
task and envisioning the correct sequence of tool-actions. By
comparison for the No-spatial-displacement group, succeeding
entailed selecting the tools while only envisioning the correct
sequence of actions as the task was in plain view. The human
ability to think about the future is unquestioned, thus older
children and adult humans should be able to envision the steps
of the task and plan accordingly. Note that participants were
not trained in the task nor they were given demonstrations
on how to solve a functionally equivalent task. In addition,
single-trial methods were used in the present studies (e.g.,
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Suddendorf et al., 2011). As
a result, these experiments serve as a potentially interesting
test of human planning under the criteria previously defined
for animals. In this regard, these findings will contribute to
the comparative research not only by offering insights on the
range of responses that can be performed in planning tasks but
also by identifying under which conditions humans produce
those responses.
EXPERIMENT 1: CHILDREN (I)
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 60 children were recruited, with 1 participant being
excluded due to experimental error, resulting in a final sample of
59 participants (28 females; 31 males) aged 4 (M = 53.13 months,
SD = 2.97, n = 30) and 5 (M = 65.38, SD = 3.44, n = 29). All
participants were predominantly White, middle class, and fluent
in English. Children were tested individually at the Center for Life
in Newcastle (United Kingdom). The experiment received ethical
approval from the Newcastle University’s Faculty of Medical
Sciences Ethics Committee (Project name: Future thinking in
children and adults). Parents provided written informed consent
for their children’s participation, and children also provided
their verbal assent.
Procedure
The experiment took place in two different areas: Room 1 and
Room 2. First, participants were presented in Room 1 with a
long narrow transparent container (16 cm length × 4.5 cm
diameter) so that they could not use their hands to reach its
bottom (e.g., 12). A 18 cm pipe cleaner with a hook made at one
end (“hook tool”), a 10 cm long × 4 mm width paper blender
stump (“puncturing tool”), a 10 cm long × 4 mm width strip of
paper (“short tool”) and a 22 cm long× 4 mm width strip of paper
(“long tool”) were used as tools. A bucket containing a reward
(e.g., 3 stickers) was placed at the bottom of the container. The
opening of the container was covered with extra-strong foil paper
and children were explained that the foil was glued to the sides of
the container (see Figure 1). Note that the puncturing tool could
only function as a tool to puncture the foil paper and the hook
tool as a tool to lift the bucket (the two ends of the hook were
made soft so they could not pierce the foil paper).
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FIGURE 1 | Task and tools used in the present experiment. From left to right:
Puncturing tool, hook tool, short tool, and long tool.
The experimenter (E) said “If you can get the stickers, you get to
keep them.” Each participant was then randomly assigned to one
of two following groups:
(1) Spatial-displacement group: For this group, the task and
the 4 tools were placed in different rooms. E and
participant went to Room 2 (i.e., Tool room). From this
area participants did not have visual access to Room 1
(i.e., Task room). E presented participants with the tools
and said “You can use some of these things to help you. Can
you think what you will need to get the stickers?” Children
were told that they should get the stickers without turning
the container. For each tool-choice opportunity, there
were no explicit instructions about the number of tools
children could choose—they could choose as many tools
as they considered necessary. Likewise, E did not inform
about the number of opportunities that participants had
to choose tools. Once children made their choice, E and
child went back to the Task room. Children were allowed
to manipulate the tools so they could learn about the
properties of the tools before making their choices. The
procedure continued as follows depending on children’s
choices:
1.1. Children chose the 4 tools. E allowed them to try
to use the tool on the task. If participants tried
to use first any of the incorrect tools, E said: “Oh
no, it does not work because we cannot get through
the paper.” Likewise, if children used the correct
tool first and tried to use any of the incorrect tools
next, E said: “Oh no, it does not work because
we cannot get the bucket.” Pilot data suggested
that children started to get frustrated if they tried
to solve the problem more than four times. For
that reason, children were given a maximum of
4 tool-use attempts to obtain the reward. At that
point, if the child had not chosen and used the
puncturing and hook tools in the correct order, E
proceeded to get the bucket out of the container
using the correct tools and gave the reward to
the participant.
1.2. Children chose one or more of the following tools:
hook, long stick or short stick. E allowed them to
try the tool(s) on the container. After each tool-
attempt, E said: “Oh no, it does not work because
we cannot get through the paper. Let’s go back to the
other room and see if there is something else that
could help you get the stickers.” This procedure
was repeated a maximum of 4 times. At that point,
if the participant had not chosen and used the
puncturing and hook tools in the correct order, E
proceeded to get the bucket out of the container
using the correct tools and gave the reward to
the participant.
1.3. Participants chose only the puncturing tool. As
before, participants were allowed to use the tool
on the container. Then, E said: “What do we do
next? Can you think what else you need to get
the stickers?” If children did not spontaneously
suggest to go back to the Tool room, E said:
“Let’s go back to the other room and see if there is
something else that could help you get the stickers.”
If children chose the hook, s/he was allowed to
use it to obtain the reward. If participant chose
any of the other tools (e.g., short stick, long
stick), E followed the procedure described in the
previous sections.
1.4. Participants chose both the puncturing tool and
the hook. E allowed them to use both tools on the
apparatus to obtain the reward.
(2) No-spatial-displacement group: For this group, the
container and 4 tools were placed in plain view in the
same room. The same procedure as for the Spatial-
displacement group was used. Likewise, for participants’
choices E followed the exact same procedure as above,
except that she omitted “Let’s go back to the other room.”
The rationale for having this condition was to assess
whether participants could solve the problem (1) when
all the elements of problem were presented in the same
room and (2) when the presentation of the task was
immediately followed by the presentation of the tools.
Data Scoring and Statistical Analyses
Sessions were video-recorded. Participants received a score of
1 if they selected only the two correct tools before using
the selected tools for the task (i.e., two-step planning). Any
other response (e.g., selecting only 1 tool) received a score
of 0. For those participants who only selected 1 tool, which
tool was chosen on the first tool-choice opportunity was also
scored. Participants were considered to have solved the task
(i.e., success = 1) if they obtained the reward by themselves
in a maximum of 4 tool use attempts and to fail the task if
the E helped them to obtain the reward after 4 attempts (i.e.,
fail = 0). In addition, the total number of tool-use attempts
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required to obtain the reward was scored. For example, a
child could choose 2 tools (puncturing tool and hook) but
scored 3 tool-use attempts (e.g., participant first used hook,
then, puncturing tool, then hook). Forty percent of the data
was coded by a second rater. Cohen’s k for planning and first
chosen tool was perfect (k = 1.000), and excellent for solving the
task (k = 0.82).
Pearson chi-square tests were used to analyze the effect
of condition and age in planning, task success, and tool
chosen first. Kruskal-Wallis tests were used to analyze the
effect of age for the total number of tool-use attempts
and Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to assess
post hoc age effects. Cramer’s V, r, η2, and φ were used
to report effect sizes for significant effects. Statistical tests
were two-tailed, and results were considered significant
if p< 0.05.
Results
Two-Step Planning
Overall, age and condition did not have an effect on children’s
responses (χ2 = 2.66, df = 1, p = 0.266; see Figure 2). That
is, children did not choose the two correct tools in their first
tool-choice opportunity either when the tools and task were in the
same room (No-spatial displacement condition) or when the tools
and task were in different rooms (Spatial displacement condition).
See Table 1 for the percentage of children selecting 1, 2, 3, or
4 tools in both the No-spatial displacement condition and the
Spatial Displacement condition.
First Tool-Choice
Children’s first tool-choice was dependent on age and condition
(χ2 = 7.30, df = 1, p = 0.014, Cramer’s V = 0.35). Further
analyses revealed that for the Spatial-displacement condition,
selecting the puncturing tool first was not determined by age
(χ2 = 1.00, df = 1, p = 0.316). In contrast, age did have
an effect for the No-spatial-displacement condition (χ2 = 7.98,
df = 1, p = 0.008, Cramer’s V = 0.52; Figure 3). In this case,
more 5 years old selected the puncturing tool first compared
to 4 year olds—suggesting that whereas older children might
be thinking about the correct sequence in which the problem
had to be solved, 4 years old might only be focusing on
the last step of the sequence. In fact, from the 5 years old
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of 4-year-olds (4YO), 5-year-olds (5YO) (Experiment 1) and adults (Experiment 2) selecting the two correct tools in their first tool-choice
opportunity grouped by Spatial-displacement condition and No-spatial-displacement condition.
TABLE 1 | Percentage of children and adults selecting 1, 2, 3, or 4 tools in their first tool-choice opportunity in both the No-spatial displacement condition and the
Spatial Displacement condition.
Experiments 1 and 2
Spatial Displacement No-Spatial Displacement
1 tool 2 tools 3 tools 4 tools 1 tool 2 tools 3 tools 4 tools
4YO 100% – – – 88% 6% 6% –
5YO 87% 13% – – 100% – – –
Adults 60% 27% – 13% 33% 67% – –
Experiments 3 and 4
Spatial Displacement No-Spatial Displacement
1 tool 2 tools 3 tools 4 tools 1 tool 2 tools 3 tools 4 tools
4YO 100% – – – 88% 6% – –
5YO 88% 12% – – 100% – – –
Adults 20% 47% 20% 13% 20% 74% – 16%
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FIGURE 3 | Percentage of 4-year-olds (4YO), 5-year-olds (5YO) (Experiment 1) and adults (Experiment 2) selecting each of the possible tools (i.e., short tool, long
tool, hook tool and puncturing tool) in those instances in which they only selected one tool in their first tool-choice opportunity. Data is grouped by
Spatial-displacement condition and No-spatial-displacement condition.
FIGURE 4 | Mean number of tool-use attempts that 4 year-olds (4YO), 5-year-olds (5YO) (Experiment 1) and adults (Experiment 2) needed to obtain the reward
grouped by Spatial-displacement condition (black bars) and No-spatial-displacement condition (white bars). Error bars represent the SD.
who selected the puncturing tool first, 92% of them selected
the hook second.
Task Success
Could the above findings be explained by a failure to solve the
problem (i.e., obtain the reward)? Age and condition significantly
affected participants’ task success (χ2 = 17.67, df = 1, p < 0.001,
Cramer’s V = 0.55). Fewer 4 years old solved the task compared
to 5 years old in both groups (Spatial-displacement condition:
χ2 = 9.94, df = 1, p = 0.002, φ = 0.58; No-spatial-displacement
condition: χ2 = 7.74, df = 1, p = 0.005, φ = 0.51). In fact, whereas
67% of 4 years old in the Spatial-displacement condition and 64%
in the No-spatial-displacement condition obtained the reward, all
5 years old obtained the reward in both the Spatial-displacement
and No-spatial-displacement conditions.
Age was also found to have a significant effect in the number
of tool-use attempts required to obtain the reward. Particularly,
4 years old needed more tool-use attempts to solve the task
than 5 years old (Spatial-displacement condition: Mann-Whitney:
U = 63.50, n = 29, p = 0.032, r = 0.54; No-spatial-displacement
condition: U = 64.50, n = 27, p = 0.044, r = 0.57; Figure 4). These
results established that poor problem-solving abilities are at play
in younger preschoolers’ performance but not in 5 years old.
Discussion
Pre-schoolers in both Spatial-displacement and No-spatial-
displacement conditions failed to select the two correct tools
before performing any tool-use action. More 5-year-old children
compared to 4-year-old children solved the task and they did so
in fewer tool-attempts than younger children.
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Poor problem-solving skills—i.e., failure at sequencing the
order in which two tools had to be used- can account for 4-
year-old children’s performance. The current findings replicate
previous research showing that children’s temporal reasoning
abilities are not fully developed before the age of 5 (McColgan and
McCormack, 2008; McCormack and Hanley, 2011) and extend
them to tool-use tasks involving reasoning about future goals.
There is no question that adults are better at planning
than young children. Thus, if the present planning task is still
challenging for children because it encompasses envisioning
a sequence of actions, then adults would be expected to
perform better than children. This possibility was investigated
by presenting adults with the same task that children received
in Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 2: ADULTS (I)
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-one young adults were recruited and 1 was excluded
due to malfunctioning of the apparatus, resulting in a final
sample of 30 participants (27 females; 3 males) aged between
18 and 35 years. All participants were predominantly White,
middle class, and fluent in English. Participants were tested
individually in the lab facilities at the Institute of Neuroscience.
The experiment received ethical approval from the Newcastle
University’s Faculty of Medical Sciences Ethics Committee
(Project name: Future thinking in children and adults). Adult
participants provided written informed consent.
Procedure
The exact same procedure as in Experiment 1 was followed.
Chocolates were used as rewards.
Data Scoring and Statistical Analyses
Data coding and statistical analyses were the same was
in Experiment 1.
Results
Two-Step Planning
Condition had an effect on participants’ responses (χ2 = 4.82,
df = 1, p = 0.028, φ = 0.40)—with more participants in
the No-spatial-displacement condition (67%) choosing the two
correct tools before using them than in the Spatial-displacement
condition (27%) (Figure 2; see also Table 1 for the percentage
of participants selecting 1, 2, 3, or 4 tools in both the No-
spatial displacement condition and the Spatial Displacement
condition).
First Tool-Choice
Participants’ first tool-choice was dependent on condition
(χ2 = 5.00, df = 1, p = 0.025, φ = 0.40; Figure 3). In
this case, more adults selected the puncturing tool first in
the No-spatial-displacement condition compared to Spatial-
displacement condition—indicating that having the problem
in participants’ view might have facilitated thinking about
the sequence in which the problem had to be solved.
From those participants who chose the puncturing tool
first, 100% chose the hook second in both conditions—
indicating that participants might have envisioned the correct
sequence of actions.
Task Success
Condition did not have a significant effect in the number of
tool-use attempts required to obtain the reward (Mann-Whitney:
U = 112.50, n = 30, p = 1; Figure 4). Note that all adults succeeded
at obtaining the reward in both the Spatial-displacement and
No-spatial-displacement groups.
Discussion
More adults in the No-spatial-displacement group compared to
the Spatial-displacement group successfully chose the correct two
tools before performing in the apparatus. All participants in both
conditions successfully solved the task.
Certainly, the cognitive mechanisms involved in planning
are fully matured in adults. However, adults’ performance in
the Spatial-displacement group did not select the two tools
required to obtain the reward. Motivation or differences in
procedure cannot account for these differences because reward
and script were the same for both groups. One possibility is
that participants in the No-spatial-displacement and Spatial-
displacement groups used different strategies. Decision-making
and problem-solving research has shown that adults select
among different decision strategies by making a trade-off
between the possibility of making correct decisions and the
possibility of minimizing effort (Payne, 1976; Johnson and
Meyer, 1984; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011). For example,
when facing a maze problem people usually choose what
seems the most direct path to the goal at each step—even
though this choice might be incorrect. Similarly, adults in
the Spatial-displacement group might have traded off accuracy
for cognitive effort by selecting the tool that seemingly could
have two functions—piercing and extracting1. However, in
the No-spatial-displacement condition such cognitive effort was
lessened because task and tools were in plain sight—i.e., not
having to recall the task might have facilitated a more effective
planning strategy.
In order to investigate this possibility, we presented children
(Experiment 3) and adults (Experiment 4) with the same task as
before with the difference that now participants were limited to
one opportunity to choose the tools that they needed to obtain
the reward. While it is true that in Experiment 1 children did
not show planning behaviors that clearly indicated that they
envisioned the two-step sequence, limiting the number of tool-
choice opportunities might still prompt them to choose the two
correct tools—at least, in older children since they were able to
solve the problem. The same could apply to adults. However, if
participants are minimizing their cognitive effort, then it would
be expected that by limiting to one the opportunity to choose
1All adults who chose the hook first attempted to use it to obtain the reward.
Additionally, more adults in the Spatial-displacement group used the hook first
compared to the No-spatial-displacement group (χ2 = 7.77, df = 1, p = 0.005).
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tools, then, at least, adults would select the 4 available tools in
the Spatial-displacement condition.
EXPERIMENT 3: CHILDREN (II)
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 66 children were recruited, with three participants
being excluded due to experimental error, resulting in a final
sample of 63 participants (25 females; 38 males) aged 4
(M = 55.13 months, SD = 3.02, n = 32) and 5 (M = 64.68,
SD = 3.03, n = 31). All participants were predominantly
White, middle class, and fluent in English. Children were
tested individually at the Center for Life in Newcastle
(United Kingdom). The experiment received ethical approval
from the Newcastle University’s Faculty of Medical Sciences
Ethics Committee (Project name: Future thinking in children
and adults). Parents provided written informed consent for
their children’s participation, and children also provided
their verbal assent.
Procedure
The same materials as in Experiment 1 were used for Experiment
3. The procedure was also the same as in Experiment 1 with
exception that when presented with the tools, participants were
explicitly told that they could only make a choice: “Maybe you can
use some of these things to help you. But you have to think carefully
because you can only choose once, ok? Once you decide what you
will need to get the stickers, I will put the things that you did not
choose away.” Once children selected the tool/s, E removed the
remaining ones and let the children use the selected ones in the
task. For those children who did not choose the correct tools, the
E put the non-selected tools back on the table and asked them
to obtain the reward by using any of the available tools. As in
Experiment 1, children had 4 attempts to obtain the reward. This
was done to assess children’s problem-solving abilities. Also as in
Experiment 1, 50% of the participants were presented with the
task and tools in different rooms (Spatial-displacement group)
and the other 50% were presented with the task and tools in the
same room (No spatial-displacement group).
Data Scoring and Statistical Analyses
Sessions were video-recorded. Data were coded and analyzed in
exact the same way as in Experiment 1. Forty percent of the data
was coded by a second rater. Cohen’s k for planning and first
chosen tool was perfect (k = 1.000), and excellent for solving the
task (k = 0.90). Cramer’s V, r, η2, and φ were used to report effect
sizes for significant effects. Statistical tests were two-tailed, and
results were considered significant if p< 0.05.
Results and Discussion
Two-Step Planning
Neither age nor condition had an effect on children’s planning
behavior (χ2 = 0.31, df = 1, p = 0.573). As in Experiment
1, children did not choose the two correct tools in advance
when both the tools and task were in the same room (No-
spatial displacement condition: 6% of 4YO and none of the 5YO)
nor when the tools and task were in different rooms (Spatial
displacement condition: none of 4YO and 12% of the 5YO; see
Table 1). These results suggest that limiting the number of tool-
choice opportunities did not improve children’s abilities to select
the two tools required to solve the problem.
First Chosen Tool
The total number of tools selected by the children in their only
choice was not affected by age (Mann-Whitney: U = 492.5,
p = 0.953, n = 63) or condition (Mann-Whitney U = 470.5,
p = 0.669, n = 63). From all the children who only chose one
tool, neither age nor condition were found to affect the selection
of the correct first tool (χ2 = 2.41, df = 1, p = 0.121). These
results suggest that forcing children to only make one choice did
not improve their accuracy at selecting the tools they needed to
solve the problem.
Task Success
Recall that for all children who did not select the two correct
tools in their only tool-choice, E put the remaining objects
back on the table. When task success was analyzed, neither
age nor condition were found to affect children’s performance
(χ2 = 0.005, df = 1, p = 0.941). However, whereas 80% of
5 years old, obtained the reward in both the Spatial-displacement
and the No-spatial-displacement groups, 69% of 4 year-olds did
so in both conditions. The number of tool-use attempts was
not determined by age (No-spatial displacement: Mann-Whitney
U = 96, p = 0.438, n = 32; Spatial displacement: Mann-Whitney
U = 103.5, p = 0.457, n = 31).
Overall, these results replicated the findings from Experiment
1. Younger children’s performance can be explained by their
difficulty to solve the problem. In contrast, older children
were able to solve the problem but failed to anticipate that
they needed two tools to obtain the reward. Next, adults’
performance was examined.
EXPERIMENT 4: ADULTS (II)
Materials and Methods
Participants
Thirty-one young adults were recruited (18 females; 13 males)
with one participant being excluded due to experimental error,
resulting in a final sample of 30 participants aged between
18 and 35 years. All participants were predominantly White,
middle class, and fluent in English. Participants were tested
individually in the lab facilities at the Institute of Neuroscience.
The experiment received ethical approval from the Newcastle
University’s Faculty of Medical Sciences Ethics Committee
(Project name: Future thinking in children and adults). Adult
participants provided written informed consent.
Procedure
The same materials as in previous Experiments were used
for Experiment 4. The procedure was also the same as
in Experiment 3.
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Data Scoring and Statistical Analyses
Sessions were video-recorded. Data were coded and analyzed in
exact the same way as in Experiment 3.
Results and Discussion
Two-Step Planning
In this case, participants’ planning and ability to envision the
two-steps sequence were determined by condition (χ2 = 4.88,
df = 1, p = 0.050). In the Spatial displacement condition,
46% of the participants selected the two correct tools in their
only tool-choice opportunity and 85% did so in the No-spatial
displacement condition. Thus, compared to Experiment 2, the
number of participants selecting the 2 correct tools increased in
this Experiment.
First Chosen Tool
The total number of tools selected by the participants in their
only choice opportunity was not affected by condition (Mann-
Whitney U = 28.50, p = 1, n = 30). The idea behind this
manipulation was to investigate whether adults were minimizing
the cognitive effort by selecting the tool that looked like it could
have two functions (e.g., puncturing and lifting). If this were the
case, then more participants should have selected the four tools
in the Spatial-displacement condition compared to the No-spatial
displacement condition. Note that 20% of the participants chose
one tool in both No-spatial displacement condition and Spatial-
displacement condition. In all these cases, participants chose the
poking tool first. Moreover, in the Spatial-displacement condition
20% of the participants selected three tools and 13% selected the
four tools. In the No-spatial displacement condition, 16% of the
participants selected the four tools and none selected three tools
(see Table 1).
Thus, limiting participants to only one tool-choice
opportunity increased their tool selectivity although not
enough to help them select the two correct tools in the
Spatial-displacement condition.
Task Success
All adults obtained the reward in both the Spatial-displacement
and the No-spatial-displacement groups. And the number of
tool attempts did not differ between conditions (Mann-Whitney
U = 97, p = 0.508, n = 30). As in Experiment 2, these
findings demonstrate that performance was not determined by
participants’ problem-solving skills.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current studies showed that older children and adults
were able to use two tools in sequence to obtain a reward.
Fewer 4-year-old children—compared to older children- did
so. Crucially, participants—both adults and children- struggled
to anticipate the number of tools required to solve the
problem in their first tool-choice opportunity. Although limiting
to one the number of tool-choice opportunities improved
adults’ performance, children’s responses were not affected
by this manipulation. Adults in the No-spatial-displacement
group successfully selected the two correct tools for the
two-step sequence required to obtain the reward, but those
in the Spatial-displacement group failed to anticipate the
two correct tools.
By the age of 2 children have been shown to select an
adequate tool based on properties such as length or rigidity
(Bates, 1979; Willatts, 1985, 1999; Brown, 1990; Chen and Siegler,
2000; Gredlein and Bjorklund, 2005; see Martin-Ordas et al.,
2014 for a study showing that by age 3 children can select a
correct tool based on its diameter). In a similar task to the
one presented here, results showed that it is only between
ages 5 and 8 that children can make a tool suitable to get
the bucket out of the tube (Beck et al., 2011; Cutting et al.,
2011). Crucially, if children were given a choice between a
straight pipe cleaner and a premade hook, by the age of 4
children could select the hook to get the bucket out of the
tube (Beck et al., 2011). Thus, children seemed to find difficult
the “innovation” aspect of the task (i.e., making the tool), but
they understood what properties the tool should have in order
for them to obtain the reward (Beck et al., 2011). Importantly,
the studies described so far involve using one tool to solve a
problem. This is in contrast to studies presented here—in which
children had to use two tools in a correct sequence of actions
to solve the problem. Thus, it is possible that younger children
found the current task more difficult than older children did
because they lack the ability to sequence the two tool-use actions.
This is similar to previous studies showing that it is only by
the age of 5 that children can incorporate temporal reasoning
to their decision making (e.g., McCormack and Hoerl, 2005;
McColgan and McCormack, 2008).
The ability to plan for a future event has been reported
to develop between ages 4 and 5 (e.g., Suddendorf et al.,
2011; Redshaw and Suddendorf, 2013; Atance and Sommerville,
2014; Atance et al., 2019). In the current experiment, both 4-
and 5-year-old children struggled to anticipate the number of
tools required to solve the current task. However, their tool
selection indicated that children might have been planning
for the future event since both age groups tended to select
one of the two correct tools (see Figure 3). As mentioned
above, lacking the temporal reasoning abilities could account
for younger children’s performance to select both tools.
However, 5-year-olds did use two tools in sequence to obtain
the reward. These findings are in contrast to a previous
study showing that by the age of 5 children succeeded in
a planning task that required envisioning the order of two
future events (Martin-Ordas, 2018). Why did 5-year-old children
fail to anticipate the number of tools required to solve the
current problem?
There are two crucial differences between Martin-Ordas’
(2018) study and the present ones. First of all, it is possible
that whereas in the former the elements of the problem might
have been semantically associated (e.g., keys open locks), in the
task presented here such semantic association did not exist (e.g.,
pipe cleaners shaped as hooks might not necessary always be
used to lift buckets). Second, whereas in Martin-Ordas (2018)
children had to select one tool and decide the order in which
two future events should happen (e.g., select the key, then
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visit the marble room to get the marbles and, next, go to the
marble room), in the current task children had to envisage the
two future actions in order to select the two correct items—
with each action being associated to a particular tool. This
aspect might have posed more cognitive demands to solve the
problem—which, as a consequence, might have increased the
difficulty of the task [see Burns and Russell, 2016 for a study
showing only children over 5 years of age were able to anticipate
a future event when the cognitive demands of the task were
high (e.g., spatio-temporal predictions based on someone else’s
point of view)].
Adults can plan, envisage the future and think about temporal
sequences, so why did they struggle in the current task? The
studies presented here indicated that when limiting to one
the number of tool-choices opportunities, more participants
selected the correct two tools before performing any action
on the task—although only in the No-spatial-displacement
condition. These results suggest that adults might be selective
planners—that is, even though they can plan, adults might only
make use of this ability under particular circumstances. Recent
developmental studies have highlighted that performance in
the Spoon test is drastically affected when children are asked
to spontaneously generate the solution to a problem rather
than selecting a tool from a number of options (e.g., Moffett
et al., 2018; Atance et al., 2019). These studies indicate that
it is only by the age of 5 that children start to generate
the solutions for a future problem. Along the same lines,
the results presented here suggest that limiting participants’
choices to one—and consequently, increasing the costs of making
errors- affected their tool selectivity, at least, when the problem
was in plain sight. This is similar to what previous tool-
use studies with humans (Silva and Silva, 2010, 2012) and
great apes (Mulcahy et al., 2005; Martin-Ordas et al., 2012)
have already shown.
The constellation of results presented here suggest that, at
least, adult humans’ planning responses varied depending on
whether the problem was in plain sight compared to when
the problem was out of sight. It would be difficult to argue
that adults in these experiments did not understand the critical
features of the tasks that they had to solve—otherwise the
differences in performance between the Spatial-displacement
and No-spatial displacement conditions would not have been
found. However, this explanation remains as a possibility
for children’s performance. Still, children’s responses in the
present tasks do not necessarily indicate an inability to plan.
As mentioned earlier, children are not randomly choosing
one of the four tools; and their first tool choices seem to
indicate that there is a representation of the future event—
although, they seem to have difficulties to envision the two
steps of the problem.
These limitations should not undermine the value of the
present studies. The results presented here still have crucial
implications for the field of animal future thinking and planning.
In the current studies, participants were presented with an
unfamiliar tool-use task. It could have been possible that both
children and adults performed better if presented with a more
familiar problem (i.e., a task in which a strong semantic
association between tools and task existed). However, not all
planning situations require dealing with familiar contexts or
objects. As such, it is also insightful to study this ability
and its flexibility in less accustomed contexts. Additionally,
Suddendorf et al. (2011) suggested that tasks aiming to test
future thinking should involve using novel problems in order
to avoid (associative) learning. This is an important factor
to understand future thinking in animals, since, in most
cases, subjects are presented with unfamiliar situations that
require the use of training and multi-trial methods. In the last
20 years, comparative psychologists have provided empirical
evidence that other animals possess some type of future
thinking abilities (e.g., Mulcahy and Call, 2006; Osvath and
Osvath, 2008; Kabadayi and Osvath, 2017). These findings
have been the focus of arduous debates—with some claiming
that future thinking abilities in some animals are similar
to those in humans (e.g., Martin-Ordas et al., 2014) and
others arguing that even the strongest pieces evidence of
future thinking in animals can be acknowledged to be no
more than (associative) learning achievements (e.g., Suddendorf
and Corballis, 2007). Accordingly, if providing subjects with
more than one trial (i.e., repeated exposure to the same
stimulus-reward relationship) would entail that associative
learning—rather than future thinking- could account for their
performance, then a first response preferably without training
should be considered the standard to show future thinking.
Nonetheless, the artificiality of this situation might undermine
performance, as one could argue for the present studies—
recall that a single-trial method was used to test participants
in the present studies. Thus, these studies with children and
adults highlight conceptual and methodological issues in the
criteria described to asses future thinking (e.g., Anderson, 2001;
Silva et al., 2005; for similar arguments on tool-use tasks).
The studies also provide the set of responses that humans
display under some of the conditions required to test future
thinking in animals.
To conclude, more older children and adults compared to
younger children succeeded at using two tools in sequence
to obtain a reward. Whereas children did not select the
2 tools required to solve the problem in their first tool-
choice opportunity, adults were able to do so when the
task was in plain view. Human performance in the present
tasks highlights important points for comparative research.
First, the issue of how to measure future thinking seems
to not be completely solved if we are to focus on the
novelty of the problems and the lack of training in order
to rule out associative learning as the mechanism driving
performance in these tasks. Thus, criteria that can equally be
applied to humans and animals and that allow us to draw
irrefutable comparisons across species are needed. Second,
including groups of children and adults in comparative studies
will offer reliability to the results and will be informative
comparison groups for behavioral tests of these capacities
in animals (e.g., Anderson, 2001; Silva et al., 2005; Silva
and Silva, 2006). Examining what humans can do will
provide us with critical information to be able to identify
shortcomings in the study of the comparative research of future
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thinking and also to provide a context in which to interpret
animals’ responses.
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